It is customary in the dominant English and related schools of philosophy to restrict the terms "action" or "agency." That is, when the topic is 'philosophy of action'. This is oft
There are two perspectives available from which to understand an agent’s intention in acting. The first is the perspective of the acting agent: what did she take to be her end, and
In this paper, I present Aquinas's account of double-effect reasoning (DER) - often called the "principle," "rule," or "doctrine" of double effect. Often, if not always, DER is att
The doctrine (or principle) of double effect is often invoked to explain the permissibility of an action that causes a serious harm, such as the death of a human being, as a side e
G. E. M. Anscombe (1958) famously argued that it is not profitable to do moral philosophy until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology (see Anscombe, G. E. M.). The investiga
The doctrine of double effect (hereafter DDE) is so called because it is concerned with the moral permissibility of actions that have both a good effect and a bad effect. DDE is an
A morally good act requires the goodness of the object, of the end, and of the circumstances together. An evil end corrupts the action, even if the object is good in itself (such a
The splendour of truth shines forth in all the works of the Creator and, in a special way, in man, created in the image and likeness of God (cf. Gen 1:26). Truth enlightens man's i
The paradigm of an action for which one may be held morally responsible is one that is intentional and voluntary. To say that it is intentional is to say that one meant to do it, either as a means to achieving something else or for its own sake. To say it is voluntary is to say that it was not an uncontrolled movement or was not forced on one by internal compulsion of external pressure or constraint. One may occasionally be reasonably held responsible for unintentional actions and involuntary movements, for reasons of culpable ignorance, or neglectfulness or lack of due care and attention, but responsibility attaches primarily to the voluntary and the intentional. In acting one typically brings about more than one result, and besides those that are intended are others than are unintended but foreseen, and others that are neither intended nor foreseen. The principle of ‘double-effect’, which derives from ideas of Aquinas holds that while one is always responsible for what one intends one may not be responsible for what one merely foresees. So, for example, in restraining someone who poses a threat to others, and perhaps to themselves, one may unintentionally cause then to have a heart attack and die. That outcome may have been recognised to be a risk but it was not intended, and so long as one’s action were neither reckless nor excessive one is not morally responsible for the death even though one caused it. The principle has been widely invoked, first in Catholic moral theology and later in secular moral philosophy especially in the spheres of medical ethics and the ethics of violence and war.