Reading through what I have written about moral disagreement—and more generally practical disagreement— during the past thirty years, I find that an overall view of what such disag
In launching (or relaunching on a sound basis) the philosophical discourse about natural law which has continued to this day, Plato explored with still unsurpassed penetration the
We often find ourselves in disagreement with others. You may think nuclear energy is so volatile that no nuclear energy plants should be built anytime soon. But you are aware that
The discussion in which moral disagreement has received most attention is metaethical and concerns the objectivity of ethics. Consider a moral opinion, such as the view that it is
The domain of religious inquiry is characterized by pervasive and seemingly intractable disagreement. Whatever stance one takes on central religious questions—for example, whether
In what ways should the structure of states and their policies be affected by disagreements among their inhabitants on the foundations of political authority, and the principles of
The splendour of truth shines forth in all the works of the Creator and, in a special way, in man, created in the image and likeness of God (cf. Gen 1:26). Truth enlightens man's i
It is not surprising that such discord and error should always have existed outside the fold of Christ. For though, absolutely speaking, human reason by its own natural force and l
Disagreement is to be distinguished from mere moral difference. Two people or groups may have different moral values without those being in conflict. Disagreement occurs, however, where opposing judgements are made about the same contested general or particular matters, e.g. abortion, capital punishment, drug-use, euthanasia, sexual ethics, warfare, etc. The fact that such disagreements seem to characterise moral discussion and prove intractable is often cited as evidence that morality is just a matter of individual or group attitudes and is not objective. But disagreement does not itself show that, and in fact it tends to favour the assumption that there is some truth of the matter that one or another side is failing to recognise or accept. Where A and B are in moral disagreement about some issue, this may be due to them a) not taking account of the same considerations, or b) differing in their interpretations of their significance, or c) to the possibility that there is more than one reasonable and defensible position. This last may seem to amount to relativism but again that need not be so, for there may simply be a plurality of reasonable positions each emphasising different values or principles (e.g. in relation abortion ‘the rights of the mother’ and ‘the rights of the unborn child’. There is also the fact that of their nature moral issues are difficult to understand and work through (otherwise there would not be ongoing debate about them). Important in this connection, then, is the idea of reasonable moral disagreement in which each side acknowledges that the other is neither stupid nor wicked, but is concerned to arrive at the truth. This can go far to remove rancour from such disagreements.