In 1939, on the outbreak of war, the President of the United States asked for assurances from the belligerent nations that civil populations would not be attacked. In 1945, when th
On general the term obliteration bombing is used as the opposite of precision bombing. In precision bombing very definite, limited targets, such as airfields, munitions factories,
When an article by such a respected, learned, and orthodox Catholic commentator as George Weigel (whose many publications include a substantial book on war and peace) concludes tha
To deter is to discourage an action – or an inaction – by threatening or warning about retaliation in the event of noncompliance. The use of deterrents does not actually prevent an
According to Miscamble, neither Truman nor his secretary of state James Byrnes “raised any questions regarding whether the atomic bomb was a legitimate weapon of war.” And, as he p
I am grateful to Professor Christopher Tollefsen for his forthright critique of my book, The Most Controversial Decision. I appreciate his kind comments about my pro-life efforts h
Is owning nuclear weapons or threatening to use them effective and/or legal in assuring national and international security? Which alternatives to nuclear disarmament could nuclear
One of the deepest longings of the human heart is for security, peace and stability. The possession of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction is not the answer to this desir
The general idea of nuclear deterrence is that possessing weapons of great destruction, and stating a willingness to use them under certain circumstances, makes it less likely that an opponent will initiate or resort to aggression. Defenders of this policy claim that it has prevented wars between major powers because each is deterred by the threat of the other’s nuclear weapons. Critics, however, claim 1) that major powers have still engaged in conflict but through proxy parties (as in the Vietnam war); 2) that the policy has been escalatory leading to the threat of mutually assured destruction; and 3) that if the threatened attacks would be on innocent civilians then they would be murderous, and that it is wrong to intend to do what it would be wrong to do. This last claim has been the focus of much discussion with defenders of deterrence arguing either that it is not wrong to threaten what it would be wrong to do, or that since the threat is conditional on what a prospective enemy does, then were they to attack they would have lost the right not to be assaulted.